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Introduction 
Th is paper outlines the major policy di在erences between the post-Stalinist reform in the former 
USSR and China (Section 1). It then briefly presents the dramatic contrast in outcomes in the two cases 
(Section 2). The usual explanation is to suggest that the two systems had radically different starting 
points , with large differences in their respective capacities for 'catching up , forging ahead and falling 
behind' , to use the terminology of Abramowitz (1 986). China's 'success.' is seen as mainly due to 
'special' factors such as the strength of its historical traditions of 'capitalism' and the advantages enjoyed 
on account of the impact of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The USSR's failure is seen largely in terms of its 
'special' problems such as the greater strength of nationalism or the more conservative na.ture of the 
commumst party. 
Section 3 is the main-focus of this paper. It examines this proposition in detai l. It concludes that 
despite some important differences the two systems in fundamental respects possessed large 'catch-up' 
possibilities. Indeed , it is far from obvious that China overall possessed greater 'catch up' possibil ities 
than the USSR. The contrast in outcomes was largely caused by differences in policies selected. Th is 
applies both to economic policy and to the wider question of the relationship between political and 
economic reform. 
1 have not encountered a sinσle Western author who was involved in the Russian reform 
。
programme who has said '恥地 got the advice radically wrong'. Anders Aslund , a famous foreign advisor 
to both Gorbachev and Ye1tsin was asked in late 1992 whether he 'would do anything different now'. 
He answered : 'Not really. 1 have been in favour all along of a very liberal solution for Russia. And 
the failures suggest that one has to go in a more liberal direction , as quickly as possible' (TransitioD , 
November, 1992: 5). 
1. Contrasting approaches to the political economy of reform 
China's reform of the Stalinist system of political economy began with the arrest of the Gang of 
Four following Mao Tsetung's death in the Autumn of 1976. In the former Soviet Union the reforms 
did not really begin until 1985 when Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU. In both 
cases the reform involved a complex set of issues in both the political and the economic sphere. 
The contrast in approach in the two cases is striking. The Chinese leadership was determined 
not to allow any semblance of national disintegration. The national government fought a harsh campaign 
against the separatist movement in Tibet and it made the reintegration of Hong Kong and Taiwan into the 
Mainland a central focus of foreign policy. While the regime moved away from the depths of totalitarian 
intervention in social life, it remained an authoritarian one-party state. Serious political opposition was 
dealt with brutally, most notably in the case of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. The government 
believed that political democratisation was a diversion from the most important task , namely that of 
improving the performance of the economic system in order to raise living standard and make China a 
more powerful and respected country. 1ts position was made starkly clear by Deng Xiaoping in his key 
speeches in the late 1970s: 'In the China of today we can never dispense with leadership by the Party and 
extol the spontaneity of the masses.. .In 1966 the Chinese economy, having gone through a few years of 
readjustment, was in a position to develop rapidly. But Lin Biao and the Gang of Four did it grave 
damage. Only now ... has our economy returned to the road of sound growth. If a handful of people 
are allowed to kick aside the Party committees and make trouble, the four modernisations will vanish into 
thin air' (Deng , 1992: “-9). 
1t approached the task of improving the performance of the Stalinist economic system in an 
extremely cautious fashion. It had no blueprint. Its most striking characteristic was experimentalism. 
Price reform went slowly, so that still in 1990 only about one half of retail sales and around one-third 
of industrial means of production were sold at a free market prices. Large changes took place in the way 
industrial enterprises operated. However , in the early 1990s the vast bulk of industrial output still was 
produced in state or local community owned enterprises , with the purely 'private' sector playing only a 
small role. Not a single state enterprise of any size went bankrupt during the reform period. A massive 
'decollectivisation' of farmland operation took place, but farmland remained in local community 
ownership. The economy remained largely shielded from international competition. 1t was not for 
nothing that the Chinese leadership by the early 1990s was characterising their economic system as a 
'socialist market economy'. 
Under Gorbachev, economic reform followed a remarkably similar path to that in China. 1t also 
began experimentally with similar hesitations and anxieties among the different factions in the leadership. 
1n the 'reform wave' of 1987-88 a number of Chine 
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Th is 'reform wave' took place only three years after Gorbachev came to power1• 
The crucial difference between the Chinese approach and the Soviet approach to reform under 
Gorbachev lay in the conception of what constituted a desirable path of economic reform and what the 
relationship was between this and political reform. From as early as July 1986 Gorbachev had 
determined that a successful economic reform needed to proceed much more rapidly than the pace at 
which Soviet reforms were proceeding. He decided that this required a prior radical political reform: 
'In the summer of 1986, it became clear that Gorbachov had changed his strategy .... [H]e turned to 
'perestroika' of the political system' and his language was radicalised .... Apparently , Gorbachev had 
concluded that he could not implement a viable economic reform without breaking the entrenched political 
resistance and for that he needed a political reform , raising the pressure from below' (Aslund , 1991: 33-
34). 
Almost without exception Western commentators and advisors believed this to be a correct 
evaluation of the logic of the reform process. The notion that gradual reform of the planned economy 
was infeasible due to the authoritarian nature of the communist party was a central plank of Kornai's 
extremely influential criticism ofthe 'Th ird Way'. Kornai (1966) is scathing in his criticism ofthe 'naive 
reformers' who bel ieve that a communist party can preside over a process that h 己 considers will inevitably 
lead to its own demise. 
A chorus of trenchant criticisms was made of the Chinese communist party in the 1980s , arguing 
that the introduction of a market economy was impossible under communist rule: 'To survive and 
successfully evolve as a living social organism , the system of free markets , private property , and 
contractual buyer-seller transactions must operate within a legal order and in a politically democratic 
environment' (prybyla, 1990: 188? It was felt widely that the CCP could not itself make the transition 
to secular rational rule. It had the double burden of highly centralised traditions of Leninism plus 
millenia of centralised rule in China. The conventional wisdom , espoused in article after article and 
conference after conference was that the CCP had to be removed from its monopoly of political power 
A comparable stage in China's post-Stalinist reforms would be the late 1970s. At this point China 
had made less rapid progress in its reforms than the USSR had done by the late 1980s. The key decision 
to move ahead with fundamental system reform in China was not made until December 1978 , and even 
then the early reform measures following this were extremely cautious. As late as the Spring of 1979 
a major campaign was fought 益型旦旦出e policy of agricultural contracting to the group , which had been 
cautiously begun the previous year. In hindsight one frequently forgets the slow pace and great care with 
which the reforms were introduced in China. 
2 The fact that this proposition was contradicted by the experience of almost all the industrialising 
countries in the nineteenth century doesn't seem to bother Prybyla nor most other economists who entered 
the fray of the political debate over economic reform in the former communist countries. 
3 
if the move to a market economy was to be put into e叮叮t:
'Deng Xiaoping tried to restart China's economy without affecting the dictatorship of its 
entrenched vanguards ... A1though the term had not yet been invented , Deng sought 
perestroika without glasnost. 前lis is not a particularly unusual project. There are 
innumerable examples of similarity placed monopolists of political power who wanted 
economic modernisation without political reform ... lt does not work ... lnstead of 
duplicating South Korea and Taiwan, China seemed to have taken as its model Ferdinand 
Marcos's Philippines' (Johnson, 1990: viii-x). 
In contrast, there was a chorus of praise form the West for Gorbachev's far-sighted vision and 
daring in moving the USSR rapidly towards mu1tiparty democracy (the CPSU's monopoly of political 
power was formally ended just four years after Gorbachov began the programme of political perestroika. 
Aslund's view is representative of a large number of Western writers: 'To break the power of the party 
and state bureaucracy might be seen as the key problem of a reform. lt is difficult to perceive any other-
solution than a far-reaching democratisation with a strong popular pressure and openness balancing the 
bureaucracy' (Aslund , 1991: 14). 
Only in hindsight did some of writers begin to acknowledge the dangers of the path that had been 
followed , and even then in the most equivocal terms: '[T]o be e仔'ective ， far-reaching economic reform 
must ultimately be accompanied by political reform. Admittedly, there is a danger that the political 
reforms may come too fast and lead to anarchy , but a refusal to relax politically is an equally serious 
threat to the overall success of any reform effort'(Goldman , 1992: 65). The tentative, experimental 
economic reforms ofthe late 1980s were completely swamped by the effects of political perestroika. The 
communist party collapsed. The nation state disintegrated and a feeble , populist government was brought 
into being. The budgetary situation quickly became hopeless. The money supply ran wildly out of 
control. A disastrous spiral of withdrawal from the market was set in motion at every level from the 
republics down to the enterprise, and the system relapsed into a virtual barter economy. From heaving 
a relatively low level of indebtedness , the USSR rapidly moved towards becoming one of the world's 
most indebted countries , as the foreign trade situation careere 
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the first two years of the post-Gorbachev period have been dominated by efforts to develop large powers 
for the presidency. As this artic1e is being written (June 1993) a constitutional congress is under way in 
Moscow which seems Iikely to provide Yeltsin with executive powers greatly in excess of those even of 
the French or US presidents. The 'justification' for this great increase in the powers of their president 
is that only in this way can the radical economic reforms finally be pushed ahead , which it is promised 
will lay the foundation for future prosperity for the country. Moreover , in the e仔örts to by-pass the 
Congress of Pωples' Deputies , Yeltsin is apparent1y prepared to grant even greater powers to the 
repubIics and regions that make up the Russian Federation, threatening the po1itical disintegration of what 
remains of Russia. Stanislav ShataIin, the author of the famous 'One hundred days' programme of 
transition to a market economy is quoted to have said: 'We are being 0叮叮ed something very strange and 
perhaps even terrible - the political traditions of Tsarist autocracy and Bolshevism' (reported in the 
Observer, 16 May , 1993). 
2. Contrasting results 
ln almost a11 key aspects of institutional arrangements and policy China's post-reform economy 
in the 1980s appears as the kind of interventionist half-way house that most economists would predict 
would perform very badly. Throughout the decade private property 'rights existed in only a minor pa口
of the economy; the government continued to intervene heavily in price setting; the economy remained 
substantially isolated from the impact of world prices; the communist party continued to rule in a 
sometimes brutal and always authoritarian fashion , and intervened at a11 levels of the economic process. 
lndeed , some observers believed 出at 'market socialism' was too charitable description of this system and 
that 'market Stalinism' was more appropriate. 
ln fact , in the first decade or so of reform China's economic performance was much better than 
under Maoist policies. The rate of growth of national output accelerated sharply (Table 1). China's 
system of authoritarian political control enabled her to control population growth , despite the bulge in 
the reproducing age cohorts in the 1980s , and in per capita terms the annual growth rate of net national 
output more than doubled. A striking shift occurred in the pattern of growth , away from that which is 
characteristic of a Stalinist economy. The overall industrial growth rate , which was already very rapid 
under Maoism , changed little. However , there were important changes in the efficiency in resource use. 
ln state-run industry , there was a sharp reversal of the long-run dec1 ine in productivity which China had 
experienced in the Maoist years (Chen , et al , 1988, Jeferson , et al , 1990(a) and 1990(b)) , and China's 
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state owned enterprises began to behave in a cost-minimising fashion3• Moreover, the typical Stal inist 
relationship between the growth rate of heavy and light industry was reversed with explosive growth of 
light industry. The agricultural growth rate accelerated much ahead of that achieved during the Maoist 
period, and with much more economy in resource use. China outperformed almost all developing 
countries in terms of output growth and export performance (Table 1). Moreover , it remained relatively 
unburdened by foreign debt and achieved fast growth with relatively low inflation. 
It cannot be argued that growth in 出e 1980s was achieved at the expense of popular consumption. 
The 1980s saw a revolution in all aspects of real incomes. A remarkable improvement occurred in the 
Chinese population's diet, with large easily observable improvements in the quality of produce. A vast 
new fashion industry sprung up in the textile sector. A huge increase occurred in consumer durable 
consumption, mainly met from domestic production, with huge new industries springing up where 
formerly there had been virtually nothing. Housing space per person more than doubled over the course I 
of a decade. Large improvements took place in the availability of professional health care. A massive 
transformation occurred in the number and variety of services available. The reported improvement in 
the already exceptional figures for life expectancy and mortality rates (Table 1 ) suggests that the growth 
in living standards affected most social strata, even if there was greater inequal ity in consumption than 
under the extreme egalitarianism of Maoism. 
The disintegration of the USSR in the late 1980s led to a collapse also of proper statistical 
reporting. Any estimates are of only the roughest magnitude. Table 2 provides an extremely crude view 
of the picture as portrayed by one standard source. It shows a crisis of massive proportions , comparable 
in scale to 出e awful downturn in production in China after the Great Leap Forward4 • The consequences 
for personal incomes have not yet subject to proper statistical analysis. However , a mass of anecdotal 
evidence and personal observation support the conclusion that for a large fraction of the population, 
probably well over one-half, the period since the late Gorbachev years has seen a serious deterioration 
in living standards , alongside a large rise in income for a small fraction 0 
Th is is the conclusion of the study of 200 state owned firms during the years 1983-87 undertaken 
by Hay and Liu (1 992). 
In fact , unofficial estimates of output suggest that the downturn began before 1989, and there may 
well have been negative growth of national product over the whole 1985-1990 period (Aslund , 1991 , 
200). 
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Table 1: Comparative Economic Performance of the Chinese Economy in the 1980s 
Low income 
countnes Middle income 
China lndia (1) countnes 
A v annual growth 
rate, 1980/89(%): 
GDP 9.7 5.3 3.4 2.9 
Agricul ture 6.3 2.9 2.5 2.6 
lndustry 12.6 6.9 3.1 3.0 
Services 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.8 
A v annual real growth 
rate of exports , 1980/89(%) 11.5 5.8 0.8 5.5 
A v annual growth rate 
of population, 1980/89(%) 1.4 2.1 2.7 2.1 
A v annual rate of 
inflation , 1980/89(%) 5.8 7.7 14.9 73.0 
Debt service as % of 
exports of goods and 
servlces : 1980 4.6 9.1 11.4 26.1 
: 1989 9.8 26 .4 27 .4 23.1 
Index of av p.c. food 
consumption, 1987/89 
(1979/81 = 100) 128 113 103 101 
Daily calorie intake 
p.c. : 1965 1931 2103 1960 2482 
: 1988 2632 2104 2182 2834 
Crude death 
rate(no/ 1 000) : 1965 10 20 21 13 
: 1989 7 11 13 8 
Infant mortal ity 
rate(no/ 1 000) : 1981 71 121 124 81 
: 1989 30 95 94 51 
Life expectancy at 
birth(years) : 1981 67 52 50 60 
: 1989 70 59 55 66 
Note(l) exduding lndia and China 
Source: World Bank, 1983 and 1991 
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Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for the Former USSR (all output data and data on retail trad 
turnover are at constant prices) 









(% change on 
previous year) 
1989 1990 1991 1992* 1993* 
100 96.0 80.7 64.5 58.1 
100 98.9 90.9 77.3 68.0 
100 97.7 87.9 80.0 75.2 
100 110.4 99 .4 59.6 53.6 
5.0 8.0 150 2,500 1,000 
Notes *estimates, for Russia only 
Source Economist Intelligenc Unit, Country Report , CIS (for merly USSR) , no 4, 1992. 
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economic performance is continuing simultaneously with a slide back into authoritarianism , so that in the 
medium term, at least, Russia seems to have obtained a perilous deterioration of economic performance 
and in the quality of daily life alongside a re-appearance, though under much more anarchic conditions , 
ofpolitical authoritanism. These results are so di旺'erent ， so important for the people of the two countries , 
and of such large significance for wider issues of economic analysis , that it is imperative to have a correct 
evaluation of their causes. The following section attempts to evaluate the degree to which this result can 
be attributed to di叮叮ences in inherent system possibilities for 'catch up'. 
3. A comparison of the capacity for 'catch up' possessed by the two systems at 出e
end of the Stalinist period. 
3.1 The economic inheritance 
a. Size 
China and the USSR enjoyed a considerable advantage compared to the other reforming Stal inist 
economies on account of their vast size. Th is meant that they both had a greater possibil ity to restructure 
without loss of efficiency behind protectionist barriers. Domestic industries could potentially move 
towards profitability at wo r1d market prices within a relatively c10sed economy with growing internal 
competition and yet simultaneously benefit from economies of scale. 1n this respect they each possessed 
the potential to take the nineteenth century 'American' way to industrial prosperity behind protectionist 
barriers producing for a massive domestic market of continental dimensions5• 
b. The labour force 
General educational level 
The socialist ideals of the communist countries was reflected in their deep commitment to the 
provision of equality of access to education, especially for primary and secondary school age children. 
China's level of general education in the 1970s was very advanced for a low income country 
(fable 3). 1ndeed, the proportion of the relevant age groups in primary and secondary placed the country 
around the middle income leve1. 1n the late 1980s the mean years of schooling of the Chinese population 
aged over 25 stood at 4.8 , which was the same level as 出at for middle income countries , and stood at 
more than double the figure reported for low income countries (UNDP , 1992)(2.3 years). 1n normal 
The USA's tari旺 rates (average unweighted average) for manufactured imports were as follows: 
1820=40% , 1875=40-50% , 1913=25% 仰or1d Bank, 1991: 97). 
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times6 the quaIity of China's basic education was impressive compared to other developing countries. 
The World Bank summarised the situation in the late 1970s as follows: ' About 72 % of those who enter 
primary schools in China complete four years of education as compared with 41 % in 1ndia, 68 % in 
1ndonesia, and 38 % in Brazil ,... the achievements of Chinese children in such basic subjects as 
mathematics are on average ahead of those in most other countries' (w orld Bank, 1981: “-7). 
The Soviet Union's achievements in basic education compare favourably , with those of the 
advanced capitalist countries (Table 3). 1ndeed, estimates for the mid-1970s using international 
purchasing power parity dollars show the USSR to be ahead of all Western countries except the USA in 
'consumption' of educationa1 services per capita (Schroeder, 1983: 319). 
Higher education 
China took a strategic decision to place high emphasis within full time education upon the primary 
and secondary schoollevel. 1n 1978 only one per cent of the relevant age group were studying in higher 
educationa1 institutions , compared to 2 % in lower income countries as a whole, and 8 % in lndia (Table 
3). Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution higher educational institutions were closed for much longer 
than lower levels: 'The Cultural Revolution is estimated to have cost China 2 million middle level 
technicians and one million university graduates (in addition , only a poor quality education was given to 
those who did pass through the system during this period (World Bank, 1981 (b): 106). 1n the late 1970s 
the ratio of scientific and technical personnel to total manpower in the productive sector was low. Even 
in chemicals and machinery manufacturing , the ratio in China stood at only 4.5% , compared to 5.2 % in 
Brazil , 9.3% in Mexico and 21.1. % in the USA. Moreover , these data 'conceal the poor quality and out-
of-date character of much technical knowledge - the result of ten years of educational disruptions and 
isolation form the rest of the world ... 1n relation to China's desire and need to modernise~ its supply of 
skilled manpower is inadequate' (World Bank, 1981 的: 107). 
The USSR had a vastly more developed pool of scientific and technical personnel than did China. 
A consequence of the extremely poor record in utilising scientific skills to produce technical progress was 
that the USSR allocated sufficient resources to enable the supply of scien 
A major problem even for China'a primary and secondary education was the disruption caused 
by the Cultural Revolution , which led to schools being c10sed across much of the country for two to three 
years , and even when 出ey reopened , ideological education took a high priority in the curriculum. 
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Table 3: Educational Achievements in China and the former USSR , 1978 
No. enrolled in 
primary school as 
% of age group 
Low income 74 
countries* 
Middle income 95 
countnes 







Note *excluding India and China 
Source World Bank, 1981 
No enrolled in No enrolled in 
secondary school higher education 





















the USA (USCJEC , 1979: 745) . Thus , in addition to its large pool of highly qualified scientific workers , 
the USSR possessed an extremely large stock of moderately trained scientific workers. 
A common consequence of the difficulties of central planning was that both countries possessed 
a large stock of capital goods per unit of final product. Moreover in both cases , the capital were highly 
unreliable, with a high propensity to break down. Furthermore compared to market economies there was 
a much less reliability in obtaining spare parts from specialist producers. Thus a striking characteristic 
of both systems was the high level of engineering ingenuity at all levels of the system. Th is was 
reflected , for example in the huge numbers of general purpose lathes , used to produce a wide range of 
sp紅e parts 出at in other economies would be purchased through the market. Th is was extremely 
inefficient, but it produced a widespread basic engineering capacity. 
In neither case was the stock of scientists and engineers used well. The absence of the motive 
force of competition and profit seeking greatly reduced the incentive of enterprises to undertake technical 
progress and even led to resistance to technical progress suggested from above the enterprise. The 
pervasive atmosphere of shortage led to a widespread 'seller' market' so that in both capital goods and 
final consumption goods there was little incentive for enterprises to use available scientific ski I1s to 
improve product quality. In the belief that technical progress was a public good , a large part of scientific 
capacities were located away from the enterprises. In the USSR in 1973 , for example, only about nine 
percent of Soviet scientific workers were engaged in work in industrial enterprises , the remainder being 
located in higher educational institutions , in the scientific academies or in the branch ministries and other 
state agencies (USCJEC , 1979: 729). 
Motivation 
A large array of factors combined to produce a workforce in both China and the USSR that was 
operating much inside its capacity, even given the nature of the available capital stock. 
In agriculture, fundamental difficulties arise with production units which employ a large number 
of workers , such as the collective farm and the state farm. The special nature of the farm work process 
and the associated difficulty of evaluating work performance means that it is extremely hard to obtain 
dili 
Th is is the main reason that is so rare under non-socialist agriculture to find units of production 
which employ a large number of workers. 
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planning system found it impossible to obtain timely de1ivery of needed inputs so as to keep the 
production process running smoothly at full capacity. Consequently , the workpace was very uneven 
throughout each production period. 
Much has been written of the normally slow workpace and low work effort which resulted from 
these factors. However, it is far from the case that this represented a fixed parameter of economic 
activity. Rather, it represented a huge potential windfall gain if workers' motivation could be harnessed 
through suitable policies. An important factor which was available to enable this force to be released was 
the widespread disappointment with the standard of living attained after long years with high rates of 
saving and investment. Although by the 1970s the absolute levels of the standard of living in China and 
the USSR were very different, in both cases there was deep dissatisfaction with the poor results that had 
been produced by the communist planned economy. The introduction of suitable incentive systems could 
have released a greatly increased intensity of labour, and hugely raise output from existing resources. 
c. Entrepreneurship 
China has a much longer tradition of entrepreneurship than Russia. China's medieval technical 
revolution did not spring out of the heads of inventors independently of economic incentives. Mostly it 
occurred through the response of producers to practical problems encountered in producing for the 
market. As early as the tenth or eleventh century AD , China possessed a sophisticated economy , with 
a highly developed market structure compared to the rest of the contemporary world. It was arguably 
the world's mostly highly urbanised country until at least the late middle ages in Europe. Although China 
did not make the breakthrough to a an Industrial Revolution along European lines , the growth of output, 
market systems and urban places continued over subsequent centuries. Whether or not one chooses to 
call this development a process of emerging 'capitalist sprouts' , it is clear that China had a highly 
developed entrepreneurial system for many centuries before the European Industrial Revolution. The 
most advanced areas by the sixteenth or seventeenth century were those along the Eastern seabord , and 
in the Lower Yangzi Valley. 
China's capacity to respond strongly to the 'chal1 enge' of the West in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centu 
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Exchanges of London or New York and the Szechuanese market' (Bergere, 1981: 33). 
China clearly possessed a powerful capitalist tradition , and the Chinese revolution occurred 
relatively recently , in 1949. Thus , it can be argued that the memory of capitalism was still in the 1970s 
very much al ive. 
The Russian picture initially appears very much more disadvantageous. The Russian state itself 
is a modern construct. As late as 出e mid-fifteenth century , 'Russia' was a landlocked country of modest 
size. Over much of the country there were severe natural barriers to the development of commerce and 
production for the market: 'The fundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slow tempo 
of her development, with the economic backwardness , primitiveness of social forms and low level of 
culture resu1ting from it.... The population of this gigantic and austere plain , open to eastern winds and 
Asiatic migrations , was condemned by nature itself to a long backwardness' (Trotsky , 1977: 26). The 
authoritarian state also presented serious obstacles to capital ist development through its rapacious 
intervention in economic affairs 8 • Moreover, by 1914, capitalist development had still '的 yet touched 
little more then the hem of Russia's economic system. The patches of factory industry in the Leningrad 
and Moscow districts were and in the south were no more than industrial "islands" in a vast agricultural 
sea, bordered to the north by deep forests and to the south by mountain or desert' (Dobb , 1966: 35-6). 
On top of this , the Soviet U nion experienced almost sixty years under anti-capital ist Stal inist planning. 
However , the reality is much more complex. It is true that large tracts of Russian Asia had very 
limited economic development under Tsarism. However , a growing body of revisionist scholarship is 
re-assessing capitalist development pre-1914. In European Russia pre-1860 capitalism was much more 
advanced than was once supposed (see, e.g. Gatrell , 1986: 144-150; Blackwell , 1983). By the late 
nineteenth cenωry several major centres of industrial and commercial activity had developed , often 
building on extensive traditions going back several centuries. The Moscow Region was the most ancient 
of these , being the centre of an extensive metallurgical industry which began with the formation of the 
Muscovite state during the Mongol period: 'Generations of such activity provided a pool , not 0 
See, e.g. Pipes , chapter 8, 'The missing bourgeoisie'. 
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of what is to-day termed a "world city"... .The St Petersburg entrepreneurs were involved deeply in 
foreign trade, but also in highly concentrated industries , with large working forces , corporate 
organisation, and sophisticated technology' (Blackwell , 1983: 17). 
It is true that the revolution in China occurred just 25 years before the beginnings of serious 
reform of the Stalinist economy began. However, in the intervening period there were only limited 
opportunities for individuals to practise their capitalistic skills. A prolonged 'two line struggle' affected , 
among other things , the very existence of the private sector as an ancillary to the socialist sector. During 
the co l1ectivisation campaign of 1955-6, during the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution 
in the mid-1960s , the private sector in the villages came under heavy attack as a 'snare both to poor 
peasants and to party cadres who still had bourgeois aspirations' (Walker, 1965: 75). 'Capitalism' was 
likened by the 'left' to a 'dog in the water to be beaten and drowned'. Such tight restrictions were placed 
on rural commerce and associated activities that the number of people working in 'rural commerce, food 
and drink services and material supply' fell from 2.8 million in 1957 to only around 0.7 million in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s (SSB , ZGLDGZTJNJ , 1987: 80). In the cities , the number of individual 
workers f1uctuated wildly as the campaigns against the private sector , waxed and waned , fall ing from 8.9 
million in 1953 to just 160,000 in 1956, expanding to 2.3 million in 1963 , before shrinking stead i1 y to 
just 150,000 in 1977 (SSB , ZGTJNJ , 1992: 97). 
During the early phase of collectivisation in the USSR , the Soviet leadership crudely suppressed 
the private sector in agriculture. However , the policies were very quickly revers'ed , and later formalised 
in the model statute on collective farms (1 935). By the late 1930s a large proportion of Soviet livestock 
were in private ownership , and the private sector was producing an important part of rural personal 
income. The USSR had no subsequent attack on the private sector comparable to that in China. The 
legal rural private sector was estimated to be producing around 25-30% of total agricultural outþut in the 
early 1980s (Aslund , 1991: 155). 
The Stalinist planned economy produces simultaneous shortages and surpluses without the 
possibility legally to reconcile them through the m 
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stolen materials and often employing many workers9 • It is estimated that in the USSR in the 1970s 
between thirty and forty percent of personal income came from the private sector. Indeed , it may be 
缸gued that due to the pervasivenss of shortages, ordinary individuals had to be far more entrepreneurial 
in the conduct of their daily lives than the bulk of secure wage earners in the West. 
Within the state sector of the Stalinist economies an army of people (talkachi , or 'pushers') was 
involved on behalf of enterprises in scouring the country to obtain wanted inputs in exchange for 
unwanted surpluses. In pre-1976 China the planning system produced such 'disconnection between supply 
and demand that enterprises were forced to send people to many parts of the country to get the materials 
出ey needed by personal connections , bartering and other unhealthy means. It was estimated 出at every 
day there were about three million people who were travelling in the country on an errand to purchase 
materials' (Liu and Wa嗯， 1984: 97). 
In sum , it is hard to argue that China's reforms were more successful than those in the USSR 
because the inherent capacities for entrepreneurial activity were greater than those in the USSR. China's 
traditions of entrepreneurship are, self-evidently, of much greater antiquity than those of Russia , but so 
are they of greater antiquity than almost all other major cultural areas in the world. By the mid-
nineteenth century European Russia had made up a great deal of the leeway in both commerce and 
industry. For different reasons , neither pre-revolutionary China nor Russia modernised in response to 
the Western 'challenge' as rapidly as may have been possible under a different set ofpolicies. However , 
川
'second economy' continued more or less u削ated sin叫he plan叫 economy began to be put into e叮叮t I 
even during the years of Stalin's rule, and was a very important area of entrepreneurship. The Chinese 
planned economy produced the same inherent tendency towards a large second economy. However , it 
periodicaIly had severe campaigns which greatly increased the risk attached to such activity , and I 
consequent1y sharply reduced its relative importance in such periods. 
d. Industry 
General 
The problems resulting in Stalinist economies from treating the whole of industry as a single 
factory are well known (see, e.g. Ellman, 1989, and Kornai , 1980). The planners obtain their 
information not from a team which works towards a common national purpose and therefore tell the truth 
about their productive capacities. Rather, information is provided to planners by self-interested agents , 
who have a strong incentive to provide dishonest information. Even if the information provided to the 
9 For a detailed discussion of the many di仔erent forms which the black economy could take in the 
USSR see, especially , Grossman , 1979. 
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planners were honest, there would still be large difficulties stemming from the complexity of constructing 
a national plan which attempts to replace the market entirely. The adverse economic consequences of 
this system were reflected , inter alia , in the high degree of self-sufficiency at all levels , in 'investment 
hunger' , in a pervasive tendency towards hoarding, in low product quality , in poor incentives for 
technical progress, and in high energy intensity of production. 
However , there existed many ways in which industrial performance might improve through the 
introduction of relatively simple reforms , as long as the economies were not immediately exposed to the 
full force of international competition. Such reforms might in principle begin a process of incremental 
improvement so that the industrial sector might move towards making profits at world market prices. 
If it were possible to introduce reforms that began to replace planning instructions with protìts 
as the goal of industrial enterprises , then some aspects of the economic system might be able to begin to 
improve, even in the absence of comprehensive price, ownership , labour and capital market reform . 
Enterprises might begin -to be more demanding of input suppliers to provide better quality products. This 
in turn could begin to reduce system losses through breakdown of machinery. Enterprises might be more 
interested in providing the product mix that was liable to increase demand for their products. They might 
become more concerned to select those construction companies that would complete construction work 
more rapidly. They might begin to be more interested in purchasing new equipment to operate in old 
plant than in expanding plant as fast as possible. They might begin to concern themselves about reducing 
stocks of raw materials and final products. Instead of hoarding labour and capital they might begin to 
analyse the impact on profits of extra demands for inputs and be prepared to allow workers to leave the 
enterprise if they wished. 
If it were possible to combine the introduction of a gradual shift towards the protìt motive with 
gradual reform of the price system then profit seeking might move in a direction that increasingly 
economised on scarce resources. Capital allocation , whether by administrative agents or through growing 
marketisation , might increasingly be drawn to more profitable sectors of industry. Pressure w 
Heavy industry bias 
The extreme inefficiency with which the Stalinist economies used investment resources meant th at 
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出ey required a large amount of heavy industrial goods to produce a unit of final product (fable 4). The 
quality of much heavy industrial output, especially machinery , was below that required to compete on 
world markets. However, a large part of heavy industrial output in most economies consists of 
intermediate inputs in which the product is more homogenous and quality is a less important element in 
competitiveness lO • The high level of development of the heavy industrial sector represents a potential 
windfall gain for reforming Stalinist economies. If the reforms , in the manner outlined above, were able 
to generate gradual improvements in the efficiency with which intermediate inputs were used , then these 
economies should be able to experience a period of growth with relatively low investment in the heavy 
industries. Moreover, the capacity to produce large amounts of heavy industrial output should enable 
them to be able to grow without quickly encountering a foreign exchange constraint on growth. In the 
event that the reforming Stalinist economies did encounter a foreign exchange constraint through 
limitations on their capacities to generate export earnings , then it might be advantageous to be able to use 
domestic heavy industrial products , even though their quality might be somewhat below those available 
on world markets. 
Size Structure 
An intentional emphasis on large plants in order to benefit from economies scale combined with 
a high degree of in-house production of inputs produced a relatively large share of large plants in the size 
structure of the Stalinist economies (Erlich , 1985). Writing in respect to Soviet industry one critic 
commented: 'Our factories have turned into the most "all purpose" , the most unspecialised. Striving to 
have everything at hand and not depend on producers for trifles , the directors of enterprises "naturalise" 
their economic operations... .It is much easier to produce the needed nuts oneself than to arrange for their 
delivery from specialised factories that often are non-existent' (Smelyev and Popov , 1990: 118). 
As the competitive process begins to take e缸ect in the reforming Stalinist economies , profit 
seeking enterprises should begin to able to make greater profits by buying increasing amounts of their 
inputs from specialist suppliers instead of producing them at high cost from workshops within the plant 
A logical process would be for many of these in-house operations to become independent operational 
units. There ought in principle to be considerable efficiency gains from such a re-orientation of plant 
structure. 
Creating firms from ministries and plants 
The firm is the central institution of capitalism. It is at this level that the competitive struggle 
10 In the advanced industrial economies in the late 1970s around 70% of total industrial output was 
composed of 'heavy' industry products , and of this over one half consisted of intermediate inputs 
(chemicals , rubber , plastics , non-metalic minerals and building materials , metallurgical and metal mining , 
petroleum and coal extraction, and electricity (World Bank, 1981 (b): 90). 
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Table 4 Intermediate Inputs per Dollar of GNP (1979/1980) 
Energy 
Sulphuric consumpt lOn 
Steel acid Cement (kilograms of coal 
(grammes) (grammes) (grammes) equivalent) 
USSR 136 21 116 1.49 
China 146 31 319 3.21 
USA 42 17 27 1. 16 
West Germany 61 7 47 0.56 
Japan 109 7 87 0 .48 
Source World Bank, 1981(a), and SSB , ZGTJNJ , 1981. 
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of capitaIism is most firmly rooted . The archetypical firm has been smalI or medium-scale. Such firms 
numerically dominate industry in advanced capitaIism and in recent years their role has increased , mainly 
due to technical progress. 
However, small and medium sized firms usually owe their prosperity to the existence of a 
competitive large scale sector in which large multi-plant corporations are the main actors: '付)hey played 
a central role in creating the most technologicalIy advanced , fastest growing industries of their day. 
These industries , in turn , were the pace-se前ers of the industrial sector of their economies.. .[They] 
provided an underlying dynamic in the development of modern industrial capital ism' (Chandler , 1990: 
593). The large multi-plant corporation has been a key element in the process of cost reduction and 
technical progress. Such institutions have been able to benefit from economies of scale, associated with 
reduction in unit costs from large plant size. In addition they have been able to benefit from economies 
of 'scope' associated wi出 reduced transaction costs involved in the transfer of goods and services from 
one operating unit to another (Chandler, 1990). These relate to marketing , research and development, 
installation of equipment, credit provision to customers and after-sales service and repair (Chandler, 1990: 
200). Huge corporations with tens or even hundreds of thousands of employees (e.g. Unilever , Siemens , 
Pepsico , General Electric, Philips , General Motors , Hoech哎， Samsung , Rockwell International) stand at 
the centre of the capitalist system. 
In US manufacturing as a whole , large firms (those with over 500 employees) still account for 
over 74% of total manufacturing sales (Acs and Audretsch , 1993: 70). In the UK the share of the top 
100 firms in manufacturing output has remained remarkably stable over a long period of time , at around 
two fi的s of total net output value since the mid 1960s (Hughes , 1993: 31). In many small countries like 
Switzerland, Sweden and Holland the role of large corporations is even greater: in these countries the top 
20 firms alone in 1985 accounted for 60, %, 67 %, and 95 % of total industrial employment respectively 
(Scherer and Ross , 1990: 63). 
There are large potential efficiency gains for Stalinist industry if it can move away from an 
arrangement in which the whole economy is treated as a single plant towards one in which the 
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Table 5: Distribution of Employment by Size of Establishment(%) 
Capitalist countries 
Size of 
establishment Small type Large type Social ist countries China 
1950 1970 1950 1970 1950 1970 1989 
10-100 40 35 23 20 17 11 13 
101-500 30 33 30 30 25 23 31 
501-1000 11 13 13 14 16 16 15 
over 1000 19 19 34 36 42 50 41 
Note 'Independent accounting enterprises ' only. In the absence of direct data for the 1970s this provides 
a good approximation of the size distribution of Chinese industrial enterprises then , since there were then. 
In 1978 independent accounting enterprises accounted for 96% of NVIO (SSB , ZGGYJJTJZL, 1949-
1984, 1985: 41-2. 
Source Erlich , 1985, and SSB , ZGGYJJTJNJ , 1991 
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economies into companies of sizes appropriate to the economies of scale of the respective sectors , ought 
in principle enable improvements in economic performance. 
Technical progress 
Both China and the USSR experienced extremely low returns in terms of civilian technical 
progress from their investment in human capital in science. One reason was the isolation of scientific 
research workers in institutions and universities. However, the more fundamental reason was the lack 
of interest in industry in employing the skills of scientific workers to improve industrial performance 
either directly in the plant or indirectly through acquiring the fruits of their research. Indeed , enterprise 
managers had a strong interest in resisting technical progress , let alone attempting themselves to pursue 
l t: 
'In the USSR innovation has to be "introduced". The Russian word ， νnedreniye ， imp1ies 
that it requires e旺。此， a push from above. In the West, on the contrary , one had 
industrial espionage, and efforts had to expended to prevent one's rivals learning about 
one's innovations. The reason for the contrast must be competition, which exists in the 
West even in sectors (such as the chemical industry for instance) in which giant 
monopolists may seem to be dominant; whereas in the USSR it is no accident that many 
plays and novels feature the obstructionist director who resits innovation: he has very 
litt1e incentive to do otherwise' (Nove, 1983: 76). 
By introducing the profit motive to industry, large increases in economic output could in principle 
be achieved from existing scientific personnel. Even in relation to their level of income it is likely that 
the potential for the USSR to reap windfall gains from this aspect of reform was considerably greater than 
that for China. 
A further important part of the unrealised scientific potential was accounted for by the large share 
of expertise allocated to the military sector. In both cases the share was extremely large. This reflected 
on, the one hand , the frontline position of the USSR in the Cold War and , on the other hand , it reflected 
the 'war on two fronts' against both the US and the Soviet Union that China fought from the late 1950s 
up until the early 1970s. In the early 1980s it was estimated that Soviet defence expenditures amounted 
to around 15 % of GNP , and that the defence sector absorbed 16% of domestic machinery production 
(USCJEC, 1983: 306). Moreover , the defence sector claimed a disproportionately large share of the best 
resources (USCJEC , 1982: 340). China's defence sector was much less advanced than that of the USSR 
in the 1970s, with a much greater reliance on sheer numbers of military personnel. However, the share 
of industrial resources preempted by the military sector was even greater than that in the USSR. It was 
estimated 也at in 1980 China's defence sector accounted for no less than 21 % of total industrial output 
(USCJEC , 1975: 477). In both cases there existed a very large 'peace dividend' from the end ofthe Cold 
22 
War which could release scientific and material resources for civilian use. Th is dividend could be 
especially large if the end of the Cold War coincided wi出 well-devised policies to introduce competition 
to industry leading to the intensive use for making proits of scientific skills and capital stock formerly 
tied up in the military sector. 
Despite the 'turn to the West' in the 1970s resulting in some increase in Soviet imports of foreign 
technology, equipment imports still accounted for only around 2 % oftotal domestic equipment investment 
(Hanson, 1978: 31). A leading expert in the field concluded that Soviet technology imports had played 
a 'limited' role in Soviet growth (Hanson: 1978 , 43). The vast bulk of China's technology imports had 
originated from the Soviet bloc in the 1950s. In the 1960s 'self reliance had become the watchword.. .and 
imports of equipment and technology were reduced to the selective acquisition of the most advanced 
technology. The stock of Soviet equipment was rapidly becoming obsolete and domestically produced 
equipment was primitive' (USCJ前， 1978: 311). Both China and the USSR possessed an especialIy large 
opportunity for technical catch-up , provided the foreign exchange could be generated to pay for 
technology-enhancing imports. China was in a less favourable position than the Soviet Union to take 
advantage of this opportunity , since its scientific capabilities had been so badly damaged during the 
Cultural Revolution. 
f. Agriculture 
There were large and obvious differences between Chinese and Soviet agriculture in the 1970s. 
China's land-person ratio was minuscule compared to 出at of the USSR , and its level of mechanisation 
of farm tasks was much lower. Output per person in the USSR was vastly above that in China11 • This 
gave the Soviet Union a large 'cushion' to its reform programme. 
However, there were also fundamental similarities in the agricultural situation. The most obvious 
was the institutional setting. The socialist economies all based their agricultural policies on the erroneous 
assumption , following Marx and Lenin, that agriculture, like industry contained wide possibilities for 
economies of scale in all aspects of the farm process. Th is was a centraI rationale behind the decision 
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to collectivise agriculture: 'Such despoliation of human energies and labour as takes place in the small , 
individual peasant economy cannot last any longer. If a transition were to take place from this splinter 
economy to a socialised economy, productivity of labour could double and treble , human labour could 
be saved two fold and threefold both of agriculture and for the human economy as a whole' (Lenin , 
quoted in Baran, 1957: 275). In both cases , the basic unit of production was extremely large in terms 
of the number of workers. In the Soviet Union in the 1970s the average kalkhaz contained around 500-
600 labourers (Nove , 1972: 242). In China the basic unit of organisation was either the production 
brigade or the production team (rather than the much larger peoples commune). In the late 1970s they 
contained on average 455 and 54 workers respectively (SSB , CSY , 1981: 135). 
There are deep problems with the collective and state farm method of farm organisation (s侃， e.g. 
Nolan , 1988). It is very unusual under capitalism to find farms with more than three or four workers: 
in the USA in the 1960s there was an average of just 1.9 workers per farm (Nolan , 1988: 41). The 
reason is to be found mainly in the peculiar difficulty of labour supervision in agriculture. The 
difficulties arise from the sequential nature of tasks over the course of the agricultural cycle (making it 
difficult to identify the labour contribution of individuals to a given piece of farmland) , the spatial 
dispersion of work over a wide area (leading , for example, to difficulties in evaluating the labour 
requirements of di仔'erent pieces of land) , and the large role played by weather changes , necessitating 
f1 exible responses from workers. The sum impact of these factors was to produce large managerial 
diseconomies of scale (measured by the number of workers , not the amount of capital) in most aspects 
of the direct tasks of cultivation, though there still exists large scope for economies of scale, and hence 
benefit from co-operation, in the ancillary aspects of the farm process , such as research , irrigation , crop 
spraying , processing , and marketing. Agriculture under capitalism is , typically , characterised by small 
units of production in the main farm tasks , but with large amounts of co-operation in ancillary activities. 
A further serious set of problems affected agricultural performance. These included the regular 
issuance of inappropri 
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1959-65 to over 20% in the 1970s , compared to around 5% in the USA (USCJEC , 1979: 40). In China 
agricultural investment accounted for around 11 % of state investment in the early 1970s (Lardy , 1983: 
130). However, a great deal of investment was organised and financed by collectives themselves , so that 
its final share was considerably above this figure. The growth rate of the farm sector's purchase of 
agricultural inputs was extremely rapid , averaging almost 12 % per annum from 1957 to 1978 (Nolan , 
1993: 245). The rural sector' s share of total steel products rose from 8 % in 1957 to 17 % in 1977 , and 
its share of cement increased form 9% to 25% over these same period (Nolan , 1988: 60). 
In both cases relatively simple institutional changes had the potential to produce large 
improvements in efficien句， and to release labour and a much increased share of investment for 
employment elsewhere in the economy. These represented potentially very large windfall gains for the 
reforming communist economy. Moreover, improvements in farm performance could have beneficial 
effects on light industrial growth through the supply of industrial inputs , and on overall economic 
performance through the incentive effect of improving an essential element in people's livelihood even 
in a relatively advanced economy such as the USSR was in the 1970s. In addition , it might have 
beneficial balance of payments effects through reducing food and raw material imports. 
The most important and simplest institutional change is contracting farmland out to individual 
households , allowing households to take the main decisions about organising the means of production , 
and permitting them to make the key decisions about saving and investment within the framework of a 
stable tax environment. Th is 'Iand reform' alone should be able to reverse the profound managerial 
diseconomies of scale associated with collective agriculture and state farms , and radically improve peasant 
incentives. If such a reform were associated also with sirnple changes in the way in which farrn inputs 
were supplied and with a move towards the profit motive in industry , then there would also be a 
possibility for profit seeking farm households to begin to be more demanding in their selection of inputs 
in respect both to their quality and type. 
The largest problem is that of lurnpy farm inputs. Soviet agriculture 'at first sight appears to have 
been characterised generall 
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maintenance of a large part of more lumpy inputs in the hands of profit oriented co-operatives or state 
machinery and irrigation companies. 
3.2 Government and politics 
a. Administrative capacity of the bureaucracy 
Both China and the USSR had a long tradition of centralised bureaucratic rule. They both had 
a huge Party apparatus12, which was closely interwoven with the system of state administration. It 
would be very difficult indeed to argue 出at the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus or tradition of centralised 
rule was weaker than that of Russia. lt would be hard also to argue to sustain an argument that the 
Chinese communist party apparatus was any less corrupt or any more professional1 y effective than that 
of 也e USSR in the late 1970s. lndeed , the Chinese Communist Party and administrative apparaωs had 
been badly damaged during the Cultural Revolution decade. Even more than usual in a communist 
country promotions in China during this period had been based on ideological rather than professional 
criteria (i. e. 'red' rather 血泊 'expe此').
Th is bureaucratic apparatus has been regarded by most commentators as the major obstacle to 
sensible reform policies in communist countries. Most observers have regarded it is as self-evident that 
the bureaucracy would be deeply opposed to economic reform , since reform would deprive them of power 
and status. Aslund (1 991: 14) summarises this approach as follows: 'A reform reduces the power ofthe 
bureaucracy by definition and most of the administration will inevitably oppose reform. Therefore , a 
successful reform must break the power of the anti-reform bureaucracy... To break the power of the party 
and state bureaucracy may be seen as the key problem of a reform.' 
However, the possession of an effective, competent state bureaucracy is a central element in 
explaining the rise of almost every successful industria1ising country since Britain. There were two 
logical possibilities to the problems of the old state apparatus. One was to regard it as hopelessly 
unreformable, i凶erently opposed to any kind of reform measure and to destroy it. A second , reformist 
approach was to attempt to change its goals and methods of operation. Th is would involve a gradual 
process of professiona1isation, making the organisation more youthful , introducing more rational ity rather 
than quasi-re1igious principles into its ethical foundation , and giving the members of the apparatus a 
centr 
12 The Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s numbered about 38 mi l1 ion , or around 3.5% of 
the tota1 population, while the Soviet Communist Party numbered about 18 mi l1 ion , or around 6.7% of 
the total population. 
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it. However, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus had any greater 
capacity to be transformed successfully in this reformist way than did the Soviet one. Indeed , many 
observers writing in the 1970s would have argued 出at the reverse was the case. 
b. Mass demands for political reform 
Political outcomes are far from a matter of choice by governments. One important line of 
argument is that the dramatic contrast in political outcomes in China and the USSR was not a matter of 
policy choice but was , rather, an uncontrollable consequence of the fundamental difference in political 
environment. The most important such propositions relate to mass demands for democracy on the one 
hand and the strength of nationalist feeling on the other. 
Mass demands for democracy 
The Soviet Union in the late 1970s was , self evidently , a much more highly urbanised society 
than was China. It also had a much more strongly developed interest in Western values among the 
intellectual community. It is probable that in the 1970s- there was a more widespread hope in the USSR 
that Western democratic institutions might be put into place than was the case in China. 
However, the Soviet political system appeared to most observers both inside and outside the 
country to be extremely stable. It had survived in relatively intact form since the 1920s without any 
fundamental disruptions. The system even in the post-Stalin and post-Krushchev period was sti l1 
extremely repressive allowing very limited areas of individual freedom. Moreover , China's political 
system had only recently been through a huge upheaval in the shape of the Cultural Revolution , which 
had deeply damaged the communist party for several years , unleashing a period of widespread anarchy , 
for which there is no counterpart in Soviet history. Moreover, the principaI actors in the CulturaI 
Revolution had been millions of young people who had been urged by the country's leader to 'dare to 
rebel' . 
In the Soviet Union , hopes of fundamental political change may have been more widespread than 
in China, but expectations of such change were much less. It was the policy decisions of Gorbachev in 
respect to perestroika of the political system 出at turned the strong hopes into ardent expectations. In the 
sharpest contrast, there was a near consensus among the Chinese leadership that political democratisation 
was not a part of the political agenda in the near future in China. A series of campaigns against 
'bourgeois' values attempted to reduce expectations of change among the politically active population. 
Nationalism 
In the 1970s both China and the USSR were huge multinational empires. However , the relative 
size of the 'national minority' population is a major difference between the two countries. The non-
Russian population accounted for around one half of the total Soviet population whereas the non-Han 
population in China accounted for well under ten per cent of the total population. Once the minority 
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nationalities began to pursue their demands for independence in a serious fashion in the USSR the 
situation was more difficult to control 出an would have been the case in China. 
Successful market and income growth is the most powerful force leading to the disintegration of 
ethnic di仔erences. In both cases the non-market Stalinist systems had kept the forces of nationalism intact 
in a 'deepfreeze' beneath a veneer of new 'socialist man'. The national leadership of both countries 
perpetuated a public propaganda myth that the 'nationality' question belonged to the past. ln both cases 
the 'national minorities were disproportionately concentrated in more sparsely populated , remote, 
resource-rich regions. In both cases notional liberation movements had been brutally suppressed. If 
anything, the severity of these struggles in recent times had been greater in China than in the USSR. 
China fought major battles against the Uighur (Weiwuer) 'national minority' in Xinjiang province in 
central Asia over a long period , and conducted a protracted and violent guerilla war against the Tibetan 
independence movement. 
In the 1970s in neither country was the expectation of national minority groups h igh. However, 
the policies pursued by the national leadership were strikingly different (see below). In the Soviet case 
the environment of political perestroika greatly raised the expectation of national minorty groups , whereas 
in China national policy makers repeatedly made it clear that attempts to break away from rule by Peking 1 
would be repressed brutally. 
c. Leadership perspectives 
The USSR entered the 1980s with an extremely aged leadership. Writing in 1983 , a leading 
Soviet expert commented: The most striking characteristic of [the top leadership stratum] is its advanced 
age.. .;the coming succession will inevitably bring about massive replacement of the leadership stratum , 
and will compress the turnover into a relatively short time span' (B ial缸， 1983: 400). The new generation 
of leaders which came to power in the mid-1980s had grown up entirely during the Soviet period and had 
not experienced the turbulence of the first phase of Soviet industrialisation. The bulk of their working 
life had been conducted in the relative stability of post-war recovery , post-Sta1inist growth and , finally , 




They had no first hand understanding of a market economy. The USSR 's adversary in the Cold 
War was the USA. , and the USA stood at the forefront of the consciousness of Soviet policy makers as 
the c1assic example of capitalist economics and politics. Moreover, American social science and funding 
dominated thinking in non-communist politics and economics , from academic journals through to the 
international institutions , notably the IMF and the World Bank. In the 1970s the mainstream of US-
dominated social science thinking moved even further towards an anti-state position. Only in the late 
1980s and 1990s under the impact of the collapse of the USSR and the rise of China to add to the success 
of Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries , has the mainstream of American social 
science begun to real ise 出at the role of the state is more complex than it was confidently portrayed as 
being in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Soviet intellectual community as a whole was reluctant to consider 
East Asia as having any relevance to their own policy formation. A chartiable view would suggest that 
this is mainly on account of their historical relationship with China: 'As the leader of the Social ist bloc , 
most Soviet officials did not like the idea of copying the Chinese ... Until about mid-1986 the Chinese 
reforms were bitterly attacked in the Soviet Union' (Goldman , 1992: 61). A less charitable, but probably 
more accurate view , would attribute this to little short of racism13 • Most Russians were extremely 
reluctant to believe that any of the East Asian countries , Japan included , were in any way superior to 
them , and could have much to teach them. 
Thus , the possibility that a strong , reforming communist party should in a one-party authoritarian 
fashion lead a controlled transition to an economy which for the foreseeable future might combine the 
virtues of plan and market in respect both to growth and distribution , did not gain the main ground of 
political discourse in the USSR's reform debates. Instead , it remained a marginal ised perspective harking 
back to the Soviet Union's own NEP in the 1920s. A powerful undercurrent of thinking at the highest 
level of policy making quickly emerged , and soon became the mainstream , namely , that 'real' reform 
meant moving fast down the American path of politics and economics. Opposition to this was rapidly 
stigmatised as immoral , attempting to cl ing thr 
13 Striking public examples ofthis are Solzhenytsin's Nobel Prize acceptance speech , which contains 
references to the 'Yellow Peril', and Stalin's contemptuous attitude towards the Chinese , recorded in 
Krushchev's memories. 
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some of the elder statesmen did , indeed , die in the course of the reform years , key actors remained alive, 
and in one or two key cases, notably that of Deng Xiaoping , remained in possession of their critical 
faculties despite advanced age. Most writers outside China in the course of China's reforms regarded 
the continued power of China's 'gerontocracy' as an unequivocal 'bad thing' for the Chinese people. 
They were time and again contrasted with the fresh (albeit mos t1y middle-aged) faces of the new 
generation of Soviet leaders , such as Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yeltsin , Popov , and Sobchak. These 
were, in Mrs Thatcher's , words people with whom one could 'do business' in marked contrast to the old 
dictators in Peking. 
China's old generation had a11 experienced persona11y a market economy, in some cases, such as 
Deng Xiaoping's , having lived abroad under impoverished circumstances. No-one who lived in the 
burgeoning capitalist economy of China's Treaty Ports before 1949 could fail either to be impressed with 
the dynamic power of market forces , nor dismayed at the social inequalities and insecurity it produced. 
Moreover, any perceptive observer could perceive the many ways in which well focused state action 
might improve the performance of the economy , especially that of the vast countryside. Thus China's 
leaders of Deng Xiaoping's generation were under no illusions that 'free markets' would magically solve 
China's problems. They had first hand experience of deep market fa i1ure and did not make the mistake 
of equating the operation of capitalism with a first year US student textbook's account of perfect 
competlt lOn. 
However , the generation which came to power in China in the late 1970s did not receive the 
imprimatur of rule as simply the next in line in a chain of succession. On the contrary they had , mostly , 
fought against the dominant policies of the previous Maoist epoch , and suffered greatly for so doing. 
They had , mos t1 y, been victims of the 'Two Line Struggle'. Deng Xiaoping had been reviled during the 
Cultural Revolution as the 'number two capitalist roader' , and had famously said 'it doesn 't matter if the 
cat was black or white as long as it caught mice'. ln other words one should be pragmatic in one's 
choice of economic policies , with their suitability being judged by whether or not they were, indeed , 
successful in promoting the productive forces and national prosperity. Chen Yun , who came to be 
ca 
The old men who returned to power in the late 1970s in China may be likened with those in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s who had championed the cause of a mixed economy under communist party 
rule. Chen Yun had himself been liked to Bukharin, and the position of the dominant group of leaders 
had in common the pragmatism in respect to economic policy of the Bukharinist wing of the Soviet 
communist party in the 1920s. ln both the early 1950s and again in the early 1960s , China had pursued 
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loosely NEP-type policies , and this group had been in the forefront in supporting such measures. 
The ideology of this group was closer to that of a much wider current of thinking in political 
economy in East Asia, stretching from Meij i J apan in the late nineteenth century , through to Sun Yatsen 
and the Kuomintang (initially on mainland China, and subsequently in Taiwan) , through to South Korea 
and Singapore since the 1950s. The dominant approach had been to view po1itical institutions in a 
functional w旬， regarding the best arrangement as 出at which would more rapidly produce national 
prosperity in a world of hostile international competition. 1n economic pol icy , the free market and 
Stalinist planning were regarded as being of equal irrelevance. The broad approach owed much to that 
of Friedrich List. Thus , Chiang Kaish仗， the leader of the Kuomintang , in the midst of his party's 
struggle with the Chinese Communist Party wrote in 1947 'China cannot compete with the advanced 
industrial nations. She must therefore adopt a protectionist policy with regard to foreign trade, and a 
policy of economic planning with respect to her industrial development. Private capital alone will not 
be sufficient to operate on a large scale,or to compete with the trusts and government operated enterprises 
of foreign nations. Th is is the great weakness of laissez-faire economic theory ancl makes it unsuitable 
for China' (Chiang , 1947: 279). Economic policy was interpreted as inseparable from wider 
considerations ofnational endeavour , with individual group interests firmly suborclinatecl to national goals: 
'Westem economics is merely the study of private enterprise or of market transactions , whereas Chinese 
economic theory is not confined to private enterprise or market transactions but is a combination of the 
peoples livelihoods and national defense .... [E]conomics is the study of how to make the nation rich and 
strong - to build a nation into a wealthy , powerful , healthy , and contented state. ln essence it is the study 
of national economic development' (Chiang, 1947: 243 , and 248). 
A striking illustration of the contrast between the Chinese and Soviet leaclersh ip perspective is 
the nature of the reports written by the international institutions once they statred to again influence in 
these two countries. Those produced by the IMF and World Bank for the USSR look very like standard 
recommendations for stabilisation 
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stock in trade elsewhere and were, indeed , so in their relationship with the USSR and Russia. As far as 
the World Bank was concerned , a sort of schizophrenia developed , under which almost all those who 
worked in the China department became convinced of the desirabil ity of a more pragmatic approach 
towards reform 出an that which was confidently recommended by other branches of the organisation. 
The old men who returned to power in the late 1970s in China had lived through an attempt to 
create a 'great leap forward' in political economy, such as was being recommended to Eastern Europe 
and 出e USSR. In 1958 Mao had promised to Chinese people that a communist utopia could be created 
overnight in China, and 出at within a few years massive economic progress could be achieved on the basis 
of the changed socioeconomic relationships. The Great Leap ended in disaster, with a massive collapse 
in output and tens of millions losing their lives through starvation. Th is made them deeply sceptical of 
policy advice such as that given to the Soviet leadership by Western and internal advisors , suggesting that 
radical policy changes could quickly produce excellent results. Moreover, China was still in the 1970s 
an extremely poor country and the leadership was deeply aware that policy errors could still create 
disastrous results. In sharp contrast to the Soviet leadership , which could not conceive that things might 
quickly get worse , the Chinese leadership's personal experience combined with the country's poverty 
made them to be highly risk averse in choosing policies. Their goal was not to quickly create the wealth 
of the USA or Western Europe, but rather to produce some improvement through cautious , experimental 
change. As long as China gradually became more prosperous ,then the reforms would be deemed to have 
worked; 'bu pa man , jiu pa zhan' ('Don't worry about going forward slowly as long as you 're going 
forward'). 
The Soviet leadership had experienced a lifetime of political stability. They could not imagine 
出at their country could be plunged into political turmoil by over-rapid political reform. However , the 
aged Chinese leadership had personally experienced the anarchy of political life for much of the 
'Republican' period. The hopes of more Western-oriented Chinese intellectuals for the establishment of 
1911 a stable democratic system in China a玩er the 1911 Revolution were dashed as China entered.' the 
pro 
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Writing at the beginning of the Soviet reform process, Gorbachev expressed his hopes as follows : 
The main idea of the January [1986] Plenary Meeting-as regards ways of accomp1ishing 
the tasks of perestroika and protecting society from a repetition of errors of the past-was 
the development of democracy. It is the principal guarantee of the ireversibiity of 
perestroika. The more socialist democracy there is , the more socialism we will have. 
Th is is our firm conviction, and we will not abandon it. We will promote democracy in 
the economy, in politics and within the Party itself. The creativity of the masses is the 
decisive force in perestroi切， there is no other more powerful force 
Writing early in China's reform process Deng in 1979 presented the Chinese leadership's view 
of the relationship between di旺erent aspects of the reform process as follows : 
Conclusion 
At present, when we are confronted with manifold difficu1ties in our economic life which 
can be overcome only by series of readjustments and by consolidation and reorganisation , 
it is particularity-necessary to stress publicly the importance of subordinating personal 
interests to collective ones , interests of the part to those of the whole, and immediate to 
long-term interests...... [T]alk about democracy in the abstract will inevitably lead to the 
unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and anarchism , to the complete disruption of 
political stab i1 ity and unity , and to the total failure of our modernisation programme. If 
this happens then the decade of struggle against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four wi1l have 
been in vain , China will once again be plunge into chaos , division , retrogression and 
darkness , and the Chinese people will be deprived of all hope (Deng , 1979: 55). 
Despite some important di叮叮ences ， both the former USSR and China possessed huge catch-up 
possibilities , as did most of the former Stalinist countries. The main reason for the contrast in outcome 
in China and the USSR is the difference in policies selected in respect both to narrowly economic issues , 
and to the relationship between economic and political change. The contrast in pol icies pursued was the 
result of complex historical factors leading to fundamentally different approaches towards the task of 
transforming the Stalinist system14 • 
14 For more deta i1ed discussion of these issues see Nolan , 1993 , and Nolan , forthcoming. 
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